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COMPULSORY STATE INSURANCE OF WORKINGMEN
The merits of a teleological institution, such as a system of
compulsory State insurance of labor undoubtedly is, must be judged
by the degree of its success in accomplishing the results aimed at.
A certain agreement as to the final aim is therefore necessary
for an intelligent and fruitful discussion of the subject. The pur-
pose of labor insurance is a very definite one. It is not expected
to solve the &dquo;social problem in its entirety, &dquo; insofar as this prob-
lem embraces the whole question of equitable distribution of wealth
and a harmonious development of society towards higher forms
of organization. Labor insurance, or rather, insurance of work-
ingmen, is in many respects no different from all the other forms of
insurance-it is an effort to substitute a social guarantee against
the results of emergencies and accidents for the purely personal
responsibility which is still the rule in many countries.
Now, for that very reason, any system of labor insurance is vio-
lently objected to by many. If one prefers individual responsibility
to a social guarantee, whatever his argument, he will necessarily
object most strenuously to a system of compulsory State insurance,
for the more complete and efficient the system, the more objection-
able will it seem to him. The limits of this paper do not permit an
exhaustive discussion of the comparative merits of labor insurance
and saving, which is the only alternative of provision against the emer-
gencies of the future. It may briefly be indicated, however, that in
no other branch of insurance has the alternative of saving ever been
seriously insisted upon. Think what this principle would lead to in
the domain of fire, marine or any other form of insurance. The
modern business man prefers to insure himself against the effects of a
possible burglary, or even against the fluctuation of the markets.
This has always been pointed out as evidence of the greatest and most
commendable prudence. The increase of frequency of conflagrations
or burglaries or shipwrecks, even if it could be easily proven to be the
result of them, could never be seriously used as an argument against
the various forms of insurance.
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Yet it cannot be denied that the workingman is much more
liable to meet with adversity than the comfortable home of a well-to-
do man is to go up in smoke and flame. Sickness, death, accident,
sudden unemployment-all these stare into the face of each and
every workingman. Old age, with accompanying incapacity to
work, is the inevitable fate of him whose only means of existence is
his labor power, and then only if wanted by the employer of labor.
To claim that any considerable degree of saving is possible for the
mass of the wage workers is to claim that the average wage of an
American worker is much too high for the satisfaction of his legitimate
immediate wants-an optimistic view of which the most partisan crier
for prosperity is but seldom guilty. And even if such saving were
possible, where is the guarantee against all these emergencies (sick-
ness, death, accidental injury), if they occur before the necessary
savings have been accumulated? It may be well to prepare oneself
for the &dquo;rainy day,&dquo; but will the &dquo;rainy day&dquo; delay its coming until
one is prepared?
The claim has recently been made by a trained economist and
sociologist,1 that saving (i. e., a purely individual guarantee) is a much
higher, more efficient and commendable method of gaining the
security against possible emergencies, than insurance (i. e., a social
guarantee), and that only that form of insurance is commendable
which is a modified form of saving. This view is not infrequently
met with among American economists, notwithstanding the vast ex-
perience of Europe, which all points in the direction of insurance
rather than savings. When this European experience is pointed out,
the answer is invariably given that, no matter how successful in
European countries, with their strongly bureaucratic administra-
tions, State labor insurance is utterly at variance with the individ-
ualistic ideals of the American people. Things which are un-Amer-
ican to-day are very apt to become very much American to-morrow,
however, as the social history of this country for the last fifty years
teaches us, and the extreme individualism of the American people
(a purely historic growth which has acquired in the eyes of some the
appearance of almost generic immutability) has had its foundation
very much weakened of late by the continuous attacks of perceptible
social forces. If European experiences and figures can be best used
1 Prof. J. H. Hamilton: "Savings and Saving Institutions." 
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to impress the general feasibility, practicability and usefulness of
State insurance, American experiences and statistics are perfectly
sufficient to break down the defense of inadaptability to local con-
ditions and our national psychology. In the magnificent building
for Social Economics at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition may be
found a small booth of a purely American insurance company which
makes a specialty of insurance of laborers, and only one branch of
that-the least important one-insurance against death. The booth
is decorated with statistical figures which bear directly upon the prob-
lem under discussion. The 13,448,00o industrial insurance policies
which are in force at the present time in the United States( as against
6,667,000 savings-bank accounts, only a smaller part of which prob-
ably belong to the wage-earning class of the country) bear strong evi-
dence that the American wage worker, no less than his European
brother, adheres to the principle of insurance and prefers a social
guarantee to purely personal responsibility and &dquo;self-help. &dquo;
This bit of social statistics may be used against the plan of well
regulated State insurance. It may be claimed, and in fact it has been
often claimed, that insofar as there is a demand for labor insurance,
it has been or may be supplied by private initiative, and that intro-
duction of the State into this undertaking would be an unnecessary
and harmful extension of governmental activity in competition with
private enterprise. It devolves upon us, therefore, to determine
whether State or private insurance is the better, the more efficient,
the more useful plan.
Judged simply by numerical results, the advantages of State in-
surance can hardly be overestimated. A comparison of German in-
surance statistics with the meager data obtainable in this country
leaves an impression which is hardly in favor of this country. Accord-
ing to the latest data2 &dquo;the following number of working persons have
enjoyed the benefits of: i . Sick insurance-3, 6 r 7,02 2 sick persons
(with 66,652,488 sick days) with i63,4o0,00o marks indemnity
(sickness, death-money, as well as cost of medical attendance); 2.
Accident insurance-585,596 wounded, 12,128 married women, 26,-
612 children, 256 parents (as dependent upon the wounded being
cared for in hospitals), 53,481 widows, 87,035 children, 3,147 parents
2 Official catalogue of the exhibition of the German Empire at the International Expo-
sition, St. Louis, 1904. P. 342. The English of the original is faithfully followed.
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(of deceased)-total, 768,255 persons, with 1oo,ooo,ooo marks in-
demnity ; 3. Invalid insurance-549,00o invalid pensions amounting
to 66,300,000 marks, 203,000 old age pensions amounting to 24,700,-
ooo marks; total number of pensions, 752,000, amounting to 9i,ooo,-
ooo marks; Ic~I,000 persons with 6,900,000 refunded; 33,000 persons
in medical treatment with 7,100,000 marks, total, 976,ooo persons
with 105,000,000 marks indemnity.&dquo;
&dquo; From the above statement it will be seen that in one year over
five million persons in need of help received about 370,000,000
marks. &dquo; &dquo;Help&dquo; is rather an unfortunate word, smacking of char-
ity. Over five million people received a social indemnity for in-
dividual accidents and mishaps. What has the United States to
show as against this tremendous record?
There are no figures. As was recently shown by the writer else-
where, 3 instead of sickness insurance we have medical charity with all
its harmful results, instead of accident insurance a series of common
law doctrines which make the employer’s responsibility for injury
almost a myth, and instead of life and death insurance &dquo;the tre-
mendous system of exploitation of the poorest and neediest which
goes by the name of industrial insurance. &dquo;
&dquo;We have in the United States labor insurance by unions, which
are financially weak and in which all the burden falls upon the workers
themselves. We have insurance by small private companies whose
object is gain, whose financial standing is doubtful, and whose methods
are often dishonest because of lack of control. And, finally, we have
insurance by employers, which, applying only to a few employees, is
probably accounted for in the difference of wages. &dquo;
Experience, therefore, corroborates the conclusions of a prior
reasoning that nothing short of compulsory insurance can make the
benefits of insurance universal. A study of European statistics will
clearly indicate this deduction-that the less compulsory a system of
insurance is, the fewer people partake of its benefits.
Here we have the most powerful argument in favor of a svstem
of compulsory State insurance. The advantages of universal in-
surance are not only quantitative, in that it bestows the benefits of
insurance upon everybody instead of the selected few, but also qual-
itative, as we shall presently see. Here again a few &dquo;first principles&dquo;
3 Journal of Political Economy, June, 1904. P. 379.
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must be enunciated. The writer takes the standpoint that it is the
condition of employees, and not of American employers, that calls
for corrective measures. That, he imagines, is pretty well agreed
upon by the modern, progressive American economist. It seems
clear, therefore, that the burden of labor insurance must not lie too
heavily upon the wage workers of the country. &dquo;The escape from
future suffering must not, if possible, be provided at the expense of a
perceptible reduction of present happiness, of which the average work-
ingman’s stock is by no means any too large. &dquo; An efficient system
of labor insurance must not be a burden to the workingman, and from
the standpoint of the latter that system will be most efficient, the
weight of which will be felt least by him. Socially, the expenses of
labor insurance can in no way be considered an element of cost while
it represents a legitimate claim upon the value of the product, just
as fire or marine insurance does. And if this claim cause a distur-
bance in the existing process of &dquo;normal distribution, &dquo; it is certainly
desirable that this new claim should not be shifted upon the portion
the workingman had received. In other words, the &dquo;cost&dquo; of labor
insurance should fall upon the employer. Of course each system of
State labor insurance endeavors to meet this just demand by enforc-
ing contributions from the employers. Yet, even if the employer be
forced to pay all the expenses of labor insurance (which no system of
labor insurance at present requires), will the burden be shifted upon
the workingman and react upon his wages if the system should em-
brace only a portion of the wage earners instead of the whole class;
for where the advantages of labor insurance are granted only to a
limited group, a certain mobility ot labor will act as a ready corrective
in adjusting wages .4 And universal insurance can only mean com-
pulsory insurance-that is, compulsory by the State. For a system
of insurance may come under the definition of &dquo;State insurance,&dquo; as,
for instance, the case with the German Krankenversicherung, the
actual work of which is done by co-operative organization .under
voluntary control. State insurance need not necessarily mean that
the actual work of detail be done by bureaucratic organization. The
compulsion, regulation and control are the necessary factors.
To quote again from a previous study, &dquo;Proceeding from the
4 For a fuller discussion of what the writer has called "the incidence of labor insurance"
see the article quoted in the Journal of Political Economy.
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assumption that the incidence upon profits is the more desirable one,
we see that such incidence is less open to question where the employer
pays the premiiim rather than the employee.&dquo; The necessity for
such contribution is hardly questioned by this time in Germany.
In America the fear of such contributions is the prime force of the
opposition to any system of labor insurance. Yet, if labor insurance
be intended to do away with degrading medical charity, with tedious
damage suits, and with poor- and workhouses, the justice of such con-
tributions from the industry and assistance from the State will appear
as self-evident and legitimate as is at present the appropriation for
charities and corrections. Any equitable distribution of the ex-
penses of insurance, based either upon the paying ability or the
responsibility for diseases, accidents, invalidity and fatalities, must
include the employer. This can be accomplished only through
some system of State insurance.
Moreover, if some system of universal labor insurance be acknowl-
edged necessary, it can easily be shown that State insurance is the
cheapest and most economical system in comparison with the re-
sults accomplished. Not only can a system of collection of contribu-
tions be best organized and cheapest, but a great many other econo-
mies may be introduced. Private insurance is a business, and as
well as any other business exists for profit. But any justification for
profit is here utterly lacking. The business of insurance is not a pro-
ductive business; it is simply a process of distribution. The highest
business genius, the best management cannot add any increment of
value, no matter what theory of value we advocate. As a machine
for the transformation of heat into active energy is judged by the
percentage of loss of energy, so an insurance organization must be
judged by the relation of its business expenses and’profits to the sum
total of money received. The only virtue, the only social service
private insurance business can lay claim to is the process of &dquo;solicit-
ing business, &dquo; of spreading the advantages over larger and larger
areas; but that can be done at one stroke by a legislative enactment.
As a basis of comparison between the expenses of State and private
insurance we have our American system of &dquo;industrial insurance&dquo; as
against the German system. Now, it is a well-known fact that the
very process of collection, the moving of premiums from the pockets
of the insured into the general treasury consumes from 20 to 25 per
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cent. of the premiums. 5 This does not take into consideration the
enormous expenses of the vast administrative machinery, central as
well as local, salaries, rent, etc. With the high commission the
agents are a set of miserably underpaid fellows, for a needlessly
large force of agents is kept, in order to stimulate them towards
writing &dquo;new business,&dquo; on which the commission is very high.
The work of collection scarcely demands more than two days’ work
through the week, so that the rest of the time may be devoted to
soliciting. In other words, it is not a fair claim that the nature of
the business and the character of the insured necessitate this high ex-
pense ; it is not the material that causes so much friction, but the very
organization of the machine, constructed with the view of increasing
the business. The intelligent business or professional man, who gets
the insurance policy under the very best conditions, to whom in-
surance is often a most profitable investment, has no conception of the
peculiar conditions of an industrial insurance policy.
Our case for compulsory State insurance may be summed up in
the following few statements:
i. The economic condition of the wage earner is such as to pro-
vide no guarantee against poverty and destitution in case of injury,
sickness, or loss of work.
2. Individual saving cannot be relied upon to correct this evil,
and some sort of insurance becomes necessary.
3. Unless insurance be universal it will react heavily upon the
finances of the workingman.
4. To be universal the system of insurance must be enforced and
controlled by the State; that is, it must be a system of compulsory
State insurance.
5. A well regulated system of State insurance must be more
economical and efficient than private insurance systems.
As against these advantages many arguments are brought against
State insurance of labor, both from theoretical considerations as well
as from the practical study of the insurance results. It will be worth
while to examine these arguments.
It maybe said that (I) labor insurance represents an unwarranted
5 The collecting agent usually receives 15 per cent., or even 20 per cent: The ability ofinvesting the funds is here not taken into consideration, for it is of importance only in the
"ordinary" branch of insurance, which approaches saving and is not available to the wage
worker.
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interference of the State with private industry, with the relations of
capital and labor; (2) that . it is an effort to abrogate the personal
liberty of the employer and employee; (3) that its object is to create
an unfair competition to the business of private insurance; and (4)
that it is tantamount to a process of confiscation from the employer
to the employee, and is, therefore, an obnoxious piece of class legis-
lation. It is this line of argument that is made use of in the effort
to show how perfectly un-American a system of &dquo;compulsory State
insurance&dquo; would be.
Our views of the legitimate functions of government are under-
going very rapid changes just now. Beginning with the protective
tariff and leading up to the ‘ ‘ Oleomargarine law&dquo; and the efforts to
pass the Merchant Marine Subsidy Act, the American State has often
influenced conditions of private business. A system of well regulated
sickness and accident insurance is no more an infringement upon per-
sonal liberty than an efficient employers’ liability act would be; in
fact, it is but a modified system of employers’ liability, more efficient
and less troublesome. And if it create a competition to private in-
surance, this competition would be an excellent test to determine
how far this business of insurance is economically legitimate; t. e.,
how far its profits are economically defensible, for a system of State
insurance would not eo ipso destroy the private business. The
economist has heard quite enough of this argument, we imagine, in
connection with the projects of parcels post, postal savings banks, and
the government ownership of telegraphy, And as to the personal
liberty of the employee, we might place against it the interests and
rights of the helpless wife and children, who are often left without
the slightest provision for the immediate future. In short, we still
have to hear of an argument which would represent anything more
than the natural inertia against any departure from the old, com-
placent practice of non-interference.
An exception must surely be made in favor of the argument of
excessive cost to the employers. Here we have a real social force
whose opposition to an important social measure is at least well de-
fined and easily understood.
In an extensive criticism of the German labor insurance law an
American writer emphasizes this points &dquo;The general effect of the
6 Henry W. Farnam, " The Psychology of German Workingmen’s Insurance," Yale
Review, May, 1904.
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insurance law has been to permanently turn a certain stream of income
from the pockets of the taxpayers and employers into the pockets
of the wage receivers. &dquo; The force of this statement as an argument
against labor insurance will not appear self-evident to everybody,
however. For it has truly been said7 that if compulsory labor in-
surance influences wages in the broad sense of the word, i. e., influ-
ences the true returns to the laborers for his work-it is no different
from the legislative regulation of the hours of labor, of sweating,
child labor, etc. If the point be that wages have been influenced in
the undesirable direction, it has to be shown that the wages in Ger-
many are too high and the profits too low; that Germany is losing its
hold on the international market. Whoever makes an effort to prove
all that will have quite a difficult task on his hands. If the economic
effects of labor insurance be such as this criticism indicates, one of the
most serious economic objections to the system is thus removed;
viz: that the cost of insurance, being an element in the cost of pro-
duction, will be reflected in the price of the goods and thus the work-
ingmen, as consumers, will return what gain they obtained as pro-
ducers.
The author quoted, however, finds in the working system a
series of highly harmful psychological effects. &dquo;Compulsory insur-
ance has not filled the working classes with gratitude toward the
government, since it was avowedly a measure aimed at the Social
Democratic party .and, therefore, regarded with suspicion, nor has it
made the workingmen friendly and conciliatory toward the employers,
since the burden of insurance is borne involuntarily by the latter. On
the other hand, the effect of giving them allowances and help in time
of trouble has apparently been to weaken the spirit of self-help, to in-
crease the demands upon the public purse, and to make them less
wise and responsible in their expenditure. &dquo;
Surely the claims of novelty cannot be made in favor of these
arguments. They are interesting, nevertheless, in showing that
opposition to compulsory State insurance soon reduces itself to
opposition to the very principle of labor insurance, with the wise
pointing at savings as the real method. Yet no effort has ever been
made to show that the system of private saving could accomplish
those enormous economic and social results which labor insurance
7 Norbert Pinkus, "Workmen’s Insurance in Germany," Yale Review, May, 1904.
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evidently does. Opponents of labor insurance have not tired of
putting forth that argument of increased carelessness, of the practice
of deception for the last thirty years. It seems that by a process of
natural selection this argument has survived all these years as the
most weighty one, but the statistical basis of this claim will not stand
the most superficial analysis. Where dozens of causes and factors
have combined to increase the frequency of accidents, it is extremely
hazardous to put forth the system of labor insurance as the only real
factor. As well might we say that increase in ordinary life insurance
is the cause of the growing number of suicides, and rail against life
insurance; as well might we say that fire insurance has caused the
Chicago, the Baltimore, and the East River horrors, and loudly advo-
cate the abolition of fire insurance. Statistical evidence which is
usually brought in support of this view shows nothing beside the mere
fact that since the introduction of labor insurance in Germany--i. e.,
during the last two decades-the number of accidents reported has
increased. No more glaring example of the old fallacy, &dquo;Post hoc,
ergo Propter hoc, &dquo; could be committed. The claim that labor in-
surance has been the main cause of the growth of German industry,
of German exports, and of half a dozen other important social phe-
nomena could be equally well established. In fine, has not the fre-
quency of accident grown in countries that have no system of labor
insurance as well? Let us look at the statistics of railway accidents
in this country, for instance, where one out of each eleven trainmen
is injured each year, and one out of each 130 is killed. Above all
things, let us be fair and consistent, and let us not deny the over-
worked workingman the same human right to an excusable degree of
carelessness which even the men of leisure possess.
The assertion that compulsory labor insurance has not created
gratitude toward the government and conciliation toward employers
is to our view entirely beside the mark. Shorn of its oratorical flowers,
it simply means that compulsory State insurance of labor has not
sounded the death-knell to all other efforts of the wage workers to-
ward their betterment. This, however, is not the proper function
of labor insurance at all, no matter what the secret designs of a Bis-
marck may have been. That labor insurance might have such a re-
sult was certainly feared by the progressive German wage workers and
their friends. Because of this fear the plan of labor insurance was
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objected to by the German Social Democrats on one side and by ad-
vocates of trade-unionism, like L. Brentano, on the other. These fears
have been shown to be unfounded. For that very reason the antag-
onism between the wage workers’ political and economic organiza-
tions on one hand and labor insurance on the other has gradually
vanished. German workingmen have long since found out, and the
American workingmen may soon find out, that a legally enacted and
controlled system of insurance against sickness, accident, invalidity,
old age, and death, instead of competing with, actually supplements
the work of their labor organizations. Schultze-Delitch’s ideal of a
trade-union as an organization for mutual charity has long since been
thrown overboard. American as well as English unions sometimes
still keep up some activity in that line, but they do it out of sheer
necessity, as a workingman brought to destitution by an accident or
disease may prove unsafe in his trade union-principles. It has been
acknowledged by many practical employers, as well as the majority
of American employees, that the trade-union is primarily a highly
specialized machine for a very definite object-a machine for collec-
tive bargaining-a machine whose function it is to use all legitimate
means to strike as good a bargain for its members as conditions will
permit. Though as yet there is no concerted demand on the part of
American-trade unionists for a system of compulsory State insurance,
it can hardly be doubted that the plan would appeal to them if
properly presented. It would greatly relieve the treasuries of those
unions which have at present a system of sickness and accident
benefits. With the transfer of the burden from the union to the State,
the former would be better prepared to furnish the one kind of
insurance that the unions are best able to grant-insurance against
unemployment.
The various efforts to provide for some system of State insurance
against unemployment have invariably failed, and this failure was
in no sense accidental, but inherent in the very nature of the problem.
Unemployment is rapidly becoming a more frequent cause of poverty
than even sickness or accident.8 But a free supply of means of ex-
istence to a healthy worker would be detrimental to character. Be-
sides, it would be perfectly idle to expect modem society to contri-
8 Prof. Farnam evidently forgets this break in the German system of insurance when he
quotes statistics of poverty and charity as an evidence of the inefficiency of State insurance.
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bute toward this support, when an army of unemployed is considered
a necessary condition for the working out of &dquo;economic laws. &dquo;
Nor could the ordinary unemployment be easily differentiated
from voluntary unemployment, whether in its individual form of re-
fusing anything less than the union wage or the social form of strikes.
The basis of State insurance against unemployment must necessarily
be assistance in case of absolute impossibility to obtain work for
wages ever so small. The basis of trade-unionism is &dquo;No work for
less than the standard wage. &dquo; It is evident, therefore, that unless
the State be ready to regulate wage.s it cannot conduct a system of
unemployment insurance which would be satisfactory to the union
worker. Assistance in case of unemployment, as out-of-work bene-
fits as well as strike benefits, are the natural functions of the trade-
union. But even outside of this consideration the relegation of all
other forms of insurance to the State would in no way relieve the
unions from any interest in the matter. The benefits of labor insurance
will not accrue to a perfectly passive class of wage-earners. As Mr.
Pinkus says:’’ Regulation of wages ought to, and indeed may, include
besides the means of support, also the insurance premium for sick-
ness, accident, invalidity, old age and lack of employment. &dquo; The
tendency to discount the value of the insurance from the wages will
have to be actively contested; the honest execution of any insurance
law must be actively guarded by the trade-unions. V’e may add that
an efficient system of labor insurance will never be legally enacted-
will never grow and develop without the active influence of trade-
union votes. A short experience would easily convince the union
worker that a well regulated system of compulsory State insurance
of labor will prove of great assistance to the trade-unions in their
struggle for the economic and social betterment of the American
workingman.
Washington, D. C.
1. M RUBINOW.
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